About the elite of Egypt and the Sudanese lesson
The last military coup in Sudan – in October 2021 – was and still is strongly present in the Egyptian scene from multiple sides and different levels. With the elite of change – those belonging to the “January Revolution” – the atmosphere of the 2013 coup in Egypt and its repercussions on the course of the Arab Spring as a whole and the related talk about the counter-revolution, lessons of transitional periods and democratic transformation were also brought up, as was the fact of the Egyptian role in supporting the coup. In addition to its strategic repercussions on the entire region as a whole, and the Egyptian negotiating position in the Renaissance Dam.
In this article, we try to capture some of the issues of public debate in Egypt, which were raised by the recent Sudanese event, which was a revealing moment added to other moments in the Arab region; The most recent was the Tunisian coup in July 2021; To show with it the nature of Egyptian political thinking towards Arab issues, its development, the revisions it drew, and the lessons it learned.
Tariq al-Zumar, one of the historical leaders of the Islamic Group and the head of its party, comments on Al Jazeera news about the arrest of Muhammad al-Faki Suleiman, a member of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Minister of Information and Minister of Communications, by saying, “It seems that Sudan is on the way to a coup.”
It is noted that most of the Egyptian Islamic elites living abroad have decided their position on what happened in Sudan from the first moment, as they called it the military coup, and despite their criticism of some practices of the Sudanese civil political elites or the civil component that excluded the Islamists from the scene; This did not prevent them from standing against the military coup and supporting the popular movements against it.
On October 25 – the day of the coup – the journalist, Qutb al-Arabi, affiliated with the Brotherhood, announced on his Facebook page his position on the decisions of Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sovereign Council, saying, “The military’s singling out of power in Sudan is a coup, whatever its introductions, and whatever The forces of freedom and change, which bear part of the responsibility for what the situation in Sudan has reached, were reckless, with their fatal desire to monopolize power without elections for the longest possible period.
And he added in the same post, “This is a rejected coup, and if the intentions of Al-Burhan and his companions were loyal to the people or to their revolution, he would have called for urgent elections to transfer the ruling to the real representatives of the people who are produced by the elections.”
Osama Rushdi – who is affiliated with the Islamic Group – is following the same path, saying on Twitter, “In Sudan, the first statement was issued dissolving the Sovereignty Council and Ministers, dismissing state governors and declaring a state of emergency. He promised to hand over power to an elected government, (it) a coup…” .
As for Tariq al-Zumar – one of the historical leaders of the Islamic Group and the head of its party – he comments on Al Jazeera news about the arrest of Muhammad al-Faki Suleiman, a member of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, Minister of Information and Minister of Communications, by saying, “It seems that Sudan is on the way to a coup.”
His clear position, describing what happened in Sudan as a coup, does not prevent him from criticizing the position of the Sudanese civilian elites in terms of their political behavior or decisions against the Islamic culture of the Sudanese people. During which the military is imitated, the lesson is the extent to which peoples are empowered and their will is arbitrated, and not ignored and robbed their culture and constants.. Despite that, there is no despair with life.” #Sudan’s coup.
As for Muhammad Mahsoub, deputy head of the Wasat Party and former minister in the Brotherhood’s government, he considers what is happening in Sudan a battle between freedom and tyranny, saying, “Our hearts and minds are with all those who defend freedom, democracy and civility in dear #Sudan. As for tyranny, its path is bitter, and its consequence is an order.”
As for Saif al-Islam Eid – one of the Brotherhood’s young leaders – after reminding us of one of the slogans of the Egyptian revolution, “Down with the rule of the military,” he returns to highlight the similarities between the coups of Egypt 2013 and Sudan 2021, saying, “I heard the same rhetorical contents in July (July) 2013. Is there no renewal? “. However, what is new for him, who has not yet taken his luck from Islamic discourses, is to draw lessons from what happened before and is happening now. Eid shared a post on his page entitled “The Ten Military Commandments to Contain Arab Popular Revolutions.”
The lessons of the Islamists learned from the Sudanese coup continue, and the Brotherhood journalist Hamza Zobaa sees that the communists and the leftists “excluded the Islamists in Sudan, and someone might say that this was in response to their exclusion during the time of Bashir, and both of these things are catastrophic. The generals played with the minds and feelings of everyone,” but at the same time he does not refer to what happened. In Egypt, the manipulation of the two together. And he adds, “and the learned wisdom is, “Do not trust a general and do not buy him for dirhams or dinars,” and every rule has a rare exception. #Coup_Proof_MilitaryCoup.”
As for the independent Islamist writer Gamal Sultan, he draws attention to the mistakes of politicians of every kind in Egypt and Sudan alike. He says, “The Salvation Front in Egypt was composed of liberals and leftists who believed that the danger to them and Egypt was the Brotherhood, not the military, and the Brotherhood believed that the danger to Morsi and his regime was a front. Rescue, not the military, the left in Sudan committed the same foolishness, and the Islamists there are on their way to the same foolishness, and it seems that not everyone is learning.”
Despite the clarity of the Islamists’ rhetoric rejecting Sudan’s coup, this did not prevent some from using it as an excuse to exonerate the Brotherhood from being a major cause of the 2013 coup; Where Sherine Arafa – one of the sisters – wrote in response to those who accuse the Brotherhood and Islamists of naivety in ruling when they were unable to prevent the coup, she says, “Dear civilian in our afflicted Arab country…enough nonsense and lies about the naivety of the Brotherhood and the mistakes of the Islamists, for our judgment does not come through boxes The elections, but the ammunition, and your presence, if you make farming dough, or wear a hoodie, they will also turn against you. The solution is the union of the peoples, to confront the occupation agent, from the military.”
Sudan’s coup did not take these elites as an opportunity to review their position on the 2013 coup, as they were the civilian cover for a “full fat” military coup, in the words of our Sudanese brothers, with the exception of “Izz al-Din Shukri Fashir,” the novelist and professor of political science who compared Sudan’s military search for a civilian prime minister Instead of Hamdok, the article stated that El-Beblawy was appointed prime minister of Egypt after the 3rd of July 2013 for a period of only 6 months, where Fischer wrote, “But that? Your Excellency, Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, make them a civilian government until Dr. Hazem El-Beblawi is available!”
It was also an opportunity for some – even if they were not the mainstream – to settle scores with other ideological currents. Ashraf Dawaba – one of the symbols of the Brotherhood – writes on October 25 last, saying, “Sudan is a coup in a coup…a military that has no covenant…and communists They have no morals.. and they are together on the day they agreed, declared war on everything that is Islamic and sought the approval of the Zionists.. (And likewise we entrust some of the wrongdoers with what they earned).”
Contrary to the position of the civilian elites on the coup in Tunisia, which was dominated by silence; (See the article “Hamdeen Sabahi.. Al-Shobaki and Fishir.. about the Egyptian political elite and the Tunisian crisis”), the Egyptian civil elites had a clear position on what happened in Sudan, as they considered it from the first day of the coup, and perhaps this finds its explanation in what one of the researchers called it “Obsession with Islamism” (See the article “Tunisia and Afghanistan: Medals for the Veiled and the Politics of Words”“).
The obsession with Islamism means reducing and simplifying complex phenomena in the search for the extent of the presence of Islamism in them, and their relationship to Islamists or the relationship of Islamists to them. In Tunisia, the decisions of its president – according to these elites – were against the Ennahda movement, which is called Islamic and bears the brunt of the failures of the revolution. As for Sudan, the military coup was against civilian, not Islamic, elites. Therefore, in Sudan, it was a coup, and in Tunisia, most of the Egyptian civilian elites kept silent.
It is also noted that the Sudanese coup d’état did not take these elites as an opportunity to review their position on the 2013 coup, as they were the civilian cover for a “full fat” military coup, in the words of our Sudanese brothers, with the exception of “Izz al-Din Shukri Fashir,” the novelist and professor of political science who compared Sudan’s military search for A civilian prime minister instead of the dismissed Hamdok, and between the appointment of Beblawi as prime minister of Egypt after the 3rd of July 2013 for a period of only 6 months, as Fischer wrote, “But that? Mr. Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan makes them a civilian government until Dr. Hazem Al-Beblawy is available!”
Fischer puts the event in its deeper dimension, saying, “Sudan’s coup sums up the dimensions of the decomposition of the Arab regimes and their institutions, and the real role of their armies and their foreign alliances. The fact that the coup is expected to happen does not mitigate the impact of its meaning;
As for the journalist writer Khaled Daoud, the former head of the Constitution Party, who was silent about the coup in Tunisia, he announced his position quickly since the news of Al-Burhan’s decisions. He said, “Arrests in Sudan of ministers in the Hamdok government and prominent figures in the forces of freedom and change. The military coup has not been officially announced yet. The Sudanese street is alive and alert and will not accept the return of Al-Bashir.”
In another post, we see some contradiction in the situation between what happened in Egypt and what is happening in Sudan. Where he does not see a justification for Al-Burhan’s coup despite the mistakes of the forces of freedom and change, but this same saying does not necessarily apply to the position of the Egyptian Brotherhood, as he said, “It is completely understandable and it is assumed that all the words that are said about the mistakes committed by the forces of freedom and change in Sudan after the overthrow of the dictator Omar al-Bashir. Nothing justifies the decisions taken by General Al-Burhan today, which can only be described as a military coup.”
As for Hamdeen Sabahi – the former presidential candidate who took a position rejecting Said’s coup in Tunisia – he continues to confirm his position on what happened in Sudan, saying, “The military coup is a crime against Sudan and an abortion of its revolution and its future. Our hearts are with the people of Sudan and its civil forces.” Last October 25) to announce his position, and did not follow the developments of the Sudanese event, especially the popular movement on October 30, and perhaps this is explained in the sensitivity of the position of some politicians who are still residing in Egypt; Abu Al-Ela Madi, head of the Wasat Party, has not yet announced his position on Sudan’s coup, despite the passage of more than 10 days.
This note applies to both Abdullah Al-Sanawi AndAmr Al-Shobaki Those who seek to draw lessons from the Sudanese event without stigmatizing it as a military coup, in consideration of the official Egyptian position, which was not called a coup.
Last but not least, the leftist leader who considered Said’s decisions in Tunisia a coup draws attention to the relationship between Sudan’s coup and normalization with Israel “a military coup in Sudan and the declaration of a state of emergency following a Sudanese military delegation’s visit to the Zionist entity.”
If Egypt was present strongly in Tunisia’s political crisis, or rather its “unconstitutional coup”, it is more present in Sudan’s coup not only by virtue of geographical proximity, historical coherence and population overlap, but also by virtue of the similarities and differences between the two coups. And I think that the tyranny and authoritarian situation in Egypt was before the eyes of the Sudanese revolutionaries, as was the realization of the elites of change in Egypt that what will happen to the events in Sudan has a direct impact on the political situation in Egypt, and most importantly, it was a restoration of the dream of change that still flirts with Their hearts and hearts so far, despite the difficulty and pressures of reality and the difference between the two models. “Any act of change in the region is an earthquake in the ruling houses of family states. The coup against democracy in Egypt and the transformation of the revolution into a civil war in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and investment in ruin were advanced protection projects from waves of change that will inevitably reach them one day.” This is how Islam Lotfi, one of the young leaders of the “January 2011 Revolution”, sees it.