Alliances, postponed elections, and a constitution.. 7 questions that summarize Libya’s most important files for 2022

Tripoli – The Libyans bid farewell to 2021 with great disappointment after the failure to hold the presidential elections as scheduled on December 24, which would have been the first to elect a direct president from the people, coinciding with parliamentary elections that would end years of division, fragmentation and disagreement over the political process.

The postponement of the poll came after a period of political wrangling in the absence of consensus on the legal basis for voting, a disputed election law, and the associated candidacy of controversial figures, such as retired Major General Khalifa Haftar and Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.

The period of political wrangling over the elections ended a state of relative calm in Libya after the agreement of the Political Dialogue Forum in Geneva last February, which resulted in an agreement to form a national unity government and hold elections on December 24.

What happened?

About 10 months after the formation of the current executive authority represented by the Presidential Council and the Government of National Unity by the Political Dialogue Forum, the Executive Authority extended itself after the dialogue forum failed to meet again and the elections faltered.

The Libyan crisis is entering another turning point in the struggle for power, after the dispute between the House of Representatives and the state over the political process and the right of each parliament to take measures towards the electoral process has returned.

The House of Representatives and the state may resort to consensus to run the political process and form a government by consensus between the two sides, or go to amend the controversial articles in the constitution to put it to a referendum if elections fail to be held next month.

Who will control the political scene?

The House of Representatives occupies an important position in the elections scene by taking over the drafting of presidential and parliamentary elections laws and ruling the formation of any new government. The Supreme Council of State participates in that in accordance with the Skhirat Agreement by participating in any consensual political process.

The House of Representatives has formed a committee to draw up a road map for the post-December 24th phase, to reach an understanding with the political forces on issues related to the constitutional path, the road map for elections and the sovereign positions stipulated in the Skhirat Political Agreement, on which Parliament must agree with the Supreme Council of State, according to the text of Article 15 of that agreement.

For its part, the Presidential Council is trying to impose itself on the political scene, accompanied by the Executive National Unity Government, in light of an ongoing struggle for power after the end of the government’s term according to the road map agreed upon in Geneva.

Analysts believe that any power vacuum may lead to the conclusion of new temporary deals in order to conduct a cabinet reshuffle in the current national unity government or share power between the main effective leaders and work to bring down the Presidential Council and the government together.

Observers believe that the failure to hold the elections may lead to the outbreak of a new cycle of violence, “especially that one of the presidential candidates may resort to his armed formations if he does not win the elections, which is not excluded in a country that is swimming in a sea of ​​mercenaries and in which regional and international interests overlap.” .

The House of Representatives has formed a committee to draw up a road map for understanding with the political forces on the elections and the constitutional process (Reuters)

Who are the active players?

Local parties maintain their position as an active force. In western Libya, there is the former Minister of Interior Fathi Bashagha, the head of the National Unity Government, Abdel Hamid Dabaiba, and the President of the State Council, Khaled Al-Mashri. As for the south, it is an area of ​​control for different parties.

The return of Saif al-Islam (Gaddafi’s son) to the Libyan scene again raised a surprise to some, especially after the announcement of his entry into the presidential elections and the attempt by Haftar’s forces to prevent him from submitting an appeal to run for the elections.

Saif al-Islam may search during this year for an area of ​​influence that he controls, most likely in the south, to ensure his free movement and meeting with his supporters in order to return again to the rule of Libya, especially in light of the support provided to him by Russia.

How is the situation formed militarily?

Each party maintains its influence in eastern and western Libya, with each armed formation funded by the actors on the ground trying to increase the areas of influence in light of the increase in movements in the Libyan south for armed formations seeking to expand, especially with the weakening of Haftar’s control over the south.

The rapprochement between the actors on the ground after the meeting of Fathi Bashagha with Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi and the direct communication between the President of the State Council Khaled Al-Mashri and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aqila Saleh, represents an important event that has been achieved this year that may enhance confidence between the conflicting parties to find a solution to the Libyan political crisis.

What are the expected scenarios?

Member of Parliament Izz El-Din Qwereb believes that the next stage requires first the intervention of the House of Representatives to solve the current problem to find a way out with a new map by submitting the constitution to a referendum if the Electoral Commission announces its inability to organize presidential and parliamentary elections.

Quereb adds to Al Jazeera Net, “If the new map stipulates going to a new government, then that takes time, and agreement is made with the other Libyan actors between them on that if there is a consensus.”

He stressed that the national unity government cannot provide a good environment for holding elections and services for citizens, in addition to the existence of problems for it in cities and with various parties.

Will there be political and military consensus between the Libyan parties?

Member of the High Council of State, Belkacem Debarz, believes that indicators of consensus began to appear, especially after the House of Representatives realized that the wheel would not turn without consulting with the alliance partner in its broad outlines, and if there were changes, they would not be significant.

The head of the Security Committee of the Supreme Council of State regretted what happened last year at the political level by postponing the elections, and the military failure of the “5 + 5” committee to expel mercenaries and unify the military institution, in addition to the inability of the national unity government to carry out its tasks in eastern and southern Libya.

In his statement to Al-Jazeera Net, Dabars stated that the military scene will remain as it is temporarily until the indicators of the political scene become clear, in light of unremitting efforts to draw a new real road map according to exact criteria.

Which possibilities are closer?

Political analyst and writer Abdullah Al-Kabir considers that the Libyan file is open to all possibilities, but the only good thing is the steadfastness of the ceasefire and the calm on the lines of contact.

Al-Kabeer adds to Al-Jazeera Net, “I expect a limited political change to occur during the middle of next year, while the main obstacle will continue to continue its presence by repositioning and adapting it to the new changes.”

He pointed out that the movement that began at the end of last year in Benghazi and Tobruk gives hope that the street will return to move to pressure, and that there is an indication that the state of division between the East and West is near, which is one demand for people on both fronts.

The speaker asserts that the parliament and the state may have to agree this time with the intensification of external and internal pressure to hold elections, and this existential threat may push them to end the dispute and alliance to continue and control the scene for another year or more.

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